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Introduction  
The current law in the UK is that convicted prisoners (with few 
exceptions) are denied the right to vote in national or local 
elections while they are incarcerated. Remand prisoners, and 
sentenced prisoners imprisoned for contempt of court and for 
non-payment of fines, are allowed to vote. The provisions 
disenfranchising offenders are in s3 of the Representation of the 
People Act 1969, as amended in 1983 and 2000, which states 
that:  
A convicted prisoner during the time that he is detained in a 
penal institution in pursuance of his sentence . . . is legally 
incapable of voting in any parliamentary or local election.  
 
This denial of voting rights has led to considerable criticism. At a 
time when the Government is under attack for the erosion of civil 
liberties and is encroaching on rights across a wide range of 
issues, including extending pre-charge detention, restoring the 
right to vote to convicted prisoners would be a positive step in 
affirming a commitment to fundamental rights. Although critics 
have focused on rights violations in relation to control orders, 
extended detention and the treatment of suspects, for example, 
in the Terrorism Act 2006 and the Counter-Terrorism Bill 
2007–08, the rights lost during detention have received less 
attention but may still be significant.  
 
In this article, I consider the Government’s justification for the 
ban, whether the arguments in favour of disenfranchisement are 
convincing, and whether the problems raised by the ban will be 
resolved by the Government’s limited proposals for change. It will 
be argued that prisoner enfranchisement would benefit both 
prisoners themselves and the wider society [1].
 
 
 
Although the right to vote might seem less significant than other 
rights lost or diminished on imprisonment, nonetheless the right 
to vote is significant symbolically as a recognition of the 
prisoner’s citizen status, and practically, as part of the process of 
rehabilitation. The Government has been forced to address this 
issue, as the loss of voting rights for convicted prisoners was 
successfully challenged in 2005 in Hirst v UK (No. 2) (2006) 42 
EHRR 41 in the European Court of Human Rights. The Strasbourg 
Court held that the UK’s automatic and ‘blanket ban’ breached 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which imposes an obligation on states to hold free 
elections under conditions which will ensure the free expression 
of the people in the choice of the legislature. Although the Court 
accepted that a wide margin of appreciation should be given to 
states, and that the rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 were 
not absolute, it ruled that a blanket voting ban for all convicted 
prisoners fell outside the margin of appreciation.  
 
Hirst had already completed the punitive part of his discretionary 
life sentence but was not allowed to vote during the remainder of 
his sentence, when he was being detained on the ground of public 
protection because of a perceived risk to the public. Hirst failed in 
the Divisional Court in an application for a declaration of 
incompatibility in relation to the provision in s3 of the 
Representation of the People Act 1983, but succeeded in 
Strasbourg. The European Court of Human Rights recognized that 
states that had adopted the Convention varied in their practice – 
some allowed all prisoners to vote, some allowed prisoners in 
certain categories to vote, while others did not permit it at all. 
But the Court held that the right should not be casually removed 
as this would undermine the democratic process, especially as the 
UK ban excluded thousands of people from voting. The case was 
referred in October 2005 to the Grand Chamber, which deals with 
cases raising issues of great importance and questions of 
interpretation or the application of the Convention [2].
 
It upheld 
the earlier decision of the Chamber in 2003. 
  
In the 2005 General Election, the UK government did allow 
prisoners held on intermittent custody to vote if they were 
outside the prison on that day, but the numbers involved were 
negligible. But the ruling in Hirst v UK means that the 
Government will have to amend the legislation. In response to 
the judgment, the Government published Consultation Papers on 
this issue in December 2006 (DCA, 2006) and April 2009 (MJ, 
2009), and the Government is now considering possible changes, 
to allow some categories of prisoners to vote. It has engaged in a 
public consultation process, and is considering possible options, 
before drafting new legislation. The second Consultation Paper is 
considering how any proposed changes might be implemented. 
The Government’s proposed option is to determine eligibility to 
vote on the basis of sentence and it invites views on the appro-
priate threshold and procedures for voting in prison. The 
Strasbourg Court had been particularly critical of the fact that the 
ban was not the result of a reasoned consideration of the issues, 
so a lengthy consultation process might be seen as a way of 
meeting this concern. 
 
Cases were brought in Scotland and Northern Ireland challenging 
the legality of the May 2007 elections on the grounds of 
incompatibility with the European Convention and the Scottish 
National Party has also been campaigning on this issue. In Smith 
v Scott [2007] CSIH9 XA33/04 a convicted prisoner denied 
registration brought a claim against the Electoral Registration 
Officer. The Scottish Court of Session said the legislation in the 
RPA could not be read down as Convention compliant and that 
they intended to make a formal declaration of incompatibility. 
Lord Abernathy was critical of the length of time the Government 
has spent responding to Hirst. However, in D.B. [2007] CSOH 73, 
Lord Malcolm refused to free a prisoner whose licence had been 
revoked who wanted to vote in the May Scottish parliamentary 
elections. Traynor and Fisher also brought a legal challenge in the 
Court of Session in Edinburgh to stop the May 2007 elections 
proceeding, arguing that they were not Convention compliant, as 
any changes in response to Hirst would not be made until the 
autumn Parliamentary session at the earliest. Lord Malcolm 
acknowledged the incompatibility with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, 
but rejected their claim, noting that the Government was taking 
steps to deal with the problem, but it would take time (Derek 
Traynor and James Fisher [2007] CSOH 78). A similar case 
brought in Northern Ireland, by prisoners who were unable to 
vote in the March Northern Ireland Assembly elections, also failed 
(Toner and Walsh [2007] NIQB 18).  
 
The Government’s justification for the ban  
Successive UK governments have taken the view that those who 
commit offences can justifiably be disenfranchised, and that this 
is a reasonable restriction with a legitimate aim of discouraging 
crime and promoting civic responsibility. Underpinning the 
Government’s case is the view that prisoners do not deserve the 
right to vote and that the ban is proportionate because it is 
imposed in pursuance of legitimate aims, to promote respect for 
the law and as a justifiable element of punishment.  
The undeservingness of prisoners  
The case for disenfranchisement reflects the view that prisoners 
are undeserving of rights. By breaching the social contract, it is 
argued, prisoners have forfeited key citizenship rights. In the UK 
and in many states of the US, convicted prisoners continued to be 
defined as non-citizens in so far as they lose their right to vote. 
This also reflects the view in other areas of legislation – for 
example, in the context of prospective changes in immigration 
and nationality law – that the right to citizenship needs to be 
earned through good behaviour [3]. 
 
 
The right to vote has been construed as a revocable privilege 
rather than a fundamental right, despite nearly a century of 
universal suffrage. The Government has generally favoured 
granting privileges awarded for good behaviour, rather than 
rights, to prisoners, as privileges are not legally enforceable. 
Privileges can be used as a method of control to maintain order 
and discipline, whereas rights incur costs in defending alleged 
breaches and, if they entail a rise in prison standards, in meeting 
the courts’ demands.  
 
The UK Government, and governments in many other 
jurisdictions, have resisted prisoners’ rights claims, including the 
right to vote, arguing that prisoners do not deserve the same 
rights as ordinary citizens or special rights because they are pris-
oners, and specifically do not deserve the right to vote, because 
they lack moral standing or ‘virtue’. While modern concepts of 
citizenship do not link citizenship explicitly to virtue, they do so 
indirectly, in so far as they see the prisoner as undeserving of the 
right to vote, or to stand for public office, or to take part in the 
government of the country, because of their misdeeds, while the 
less eligibility principle is used to reinforce the divide between the 
deserving and the undeserving.  
 
This was clear in the Government’s submission in Hirst v UK when 
it argued that those who had breached the basic rules of society 
should be deprived of:  
. . . the right to have a say in the way such rules were made 
for the duration of their sentence. Convicted prisoners had 
breached the social contract and so could be regarded as 
(temporarily) forfeiting the right take part in the government of 
the country. (para. 50). 
  
The Government also made it clear in its first Consultation Paper 
that it thinks it is morally right in principle to deny prisoners the 
right to vote and that it believes that the majority of the public 
feel the same way (DCA 2006, paras 56, 57). Indeed, it invited 
comment in support of retention of the status quo (DCA 2006, 
para. 58). Although no formal or large-scale studies of public 
attitudes to re-enfranchisement have been undertaken in the UK, 
when Hirst was decided in October 2005, a poll conducted in 
Manchester by the Manchester Evening News found that 74 per 
cent were opposed to giving prisoners the right to vote and 26 
per cent were in favour [4]. 
 
 
The Government has argued that this restriction on voting is not 
excessive given that prisoners have the right to vote restored 
when they return to the community. It is not permanent, in 
contrast to some states in the US where felons are disen-
franchised for life. The UK Government has also made much of 
the fact that many other states, including Russia and America, 
withdraw voting rights from prisoners and, given the 
exceptionally high incarceration rate of the United States and the 
fact that ex-offenders in some states are denied the vote on 
release from prison, means that over 5 million people – are 
disenfranchised because of criminal convictions. In the United 
States, 48 states ban sentenced prisoners from voting and 
constitutional challenges to felon disenfranchisement have so far 
failed. 
  
Historically, the voting ban represents the notion that prisoners 
are in a state of ‘civil death’. This status goes back to feudal 
times, where offenders forfeited property rights and family rights 
on conviction, so property would be taken by the king or the state 
as an additional punishment. Although the Forfeiture Act 1870 
removed most of these sanctions, offender disenfranchisement 
was retained and perpetuated in the UK by subsequent 
Representation of the People Acts.  
 
Linked to this notion of moral corruption of the prisoner is the 
belief that denying the offender the right to vote will ‘preserve 
the purity of the ballot box’ (Washington v State 75 Ala 582 
(1884) at 585). The argument that offenders will sully the purity 
of the ballot box by irresponsible or incompetent voting, or by 
electing those unfit to hold office, has been a key influence in 
United States jurisprudence (see, for example, Shepherd v 
Trevino, 575 F. 2d. 1110, (5th Cir. 1978), and Bailey v Baronian, 
120 R.I.389, 394 A.2d 1338 [1978]). This view was also 
expressed by the Latvian government in its submission in Hirst 
(at para. 55). One fear is that felons will elect criminals to 
important offices, leading to the corruption of public life. 
  
But is the denial of the right to vote those who lack moral virtue 
justifiable? This argument was rejected by the European Court of 
Human Rights in Hirst who emphasized that the right to vote was 
a right and not a privilege. While prisoners lost their right to 
liberty, their rights under the Convention were not lost by the 
mere fact of imprisonment. The Court thought that voting was an 
essential element of the democratic process which should not be 
casually removed and that there ‘is no room in the Convention for 
the old idea of “civic death” that lies behind the ban on convicted 
prisoners’ voting’ (at p. 33). Similarly, the Canadian Supreme 
Court, in Sauvé v Canada No.2) [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, argued that 
seeing prisoners as morally unworthy to vote ‘runs counter to our 
constitutional commitment to the worth and dignity of every 
citizen’ which is essential to the legitimacy of the democratic 
process (McLachlin, CJ at para. 35). The right to vote, the Court 
said, lay at the heart of Canadian democracy and the blanket 
ban, in s51(e) of the Canada Elections Act 1985, which denied 
the vote to federal prisoners serving over two years, was 
unconstitutional. The Court concluded that this was a regressive 
and obsolete law which could not be justified in a modern 
democracy.  
 
To deny the right to vote to the non-virtuous misunderstands the 
meaning of rights. The UK Government’s case is weak because 
rights do not rest on deservingness, but apply to all, even to 
those whom we might see as unworthy individuals. Fundamental 
civil and political rights, such as the right to vote, are universal 
and do not depend on the moral character of the right-holder. 
The defining feature of a right is that it should not be infringed 
simply because others might think that the person is morally 
unworthy and this concept of a right is fundamental to western 
liberal thought, exemplified by Dworkin’s work (1977, 1986). It is 
the mark of a civilized society to accord due process rights at the 
pre-trial and trial stages to everyone regardless of the crimes of 
which they are accused, and this respect for rights should also 
extend to the sentencing and punishment stages. Furthermore, 
as the right to vote arguably has a special status, it is worthy of 
greater protection than other rights. To use moral worth as a 
precondition would be moving on to a potentially politically 
dangerous slippery slope.  
 
The argument that prisoners do not deserve the benefits of 
citizenship because of their lack of moral worth is also 
contradictory, as prisoners are expected to fulfil other civic 
obligations imposed by the state, such as paying taxes, while in 
prison. A prisoner whose pay exceeds the appropriate threshold is 
liable to pay tax and national insurance contributions. So if the 
government imposes the burden, arguably the prisoner should 
also have some of the benefits of citizenship, provided that the 
rights of others are not adversely affected, and in the case of 
voting, no harms or risk to the public have been shown.  
 
Further, in the original meaning of citizenship in ancient Greece, 
citizenship was seen as promoting virtue, in imposing duties and 
obligations on citizens and directing their attention away from 
private interests, and was not limited to the virtuous. The 
non-virtuous could retain citizenship provided that they 
performed their public duties properly (Aristotle, 1992). 
Participation in political life was itself seen as a means of 
improving moral behaviour as it ensured that citizens looked 
towards the good of the polis rather than their own narrow 
interests. This argument – that participation promotes a sense of 
civic responsibility – is also found in Mill’s work (1861). Similarly, 
allowing voting rights will encourage prisoners to reflect on their 
obligations to other members of society.  
 
Disenfranchisement as punishment  
The second strand of the government’s argument is that denying 
prisoners the right to vote has a legitimate aim, namely to punish 
offenders as well as enhancing civic responsibility and respect for 
the law. Loss of the right to vote, it is argued, is justifiable and 
reasonable, as it is intended to discourage crime, and is an 
appropriate element of punishment. But is this denial of a 
fundamental right of citizenship justifiable as a penal measure? In 
Hirst the Court accepted that the government’s aims to 
encourage civic responsibility and to impose punishments were 
legitimate and compatible with Article 3 of Protocol 1, but 
concluded that the ban was not rationally linked to those aims 
and was disproportionate and arbitrary. The Court was influenced 
by the Canadian Supreme Court’s ruling in Sauvé v Canada 
(No.2) [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 that felon disenfranchisement was 
unconstitutional because it was an arbitrary and additional 
punishment.  
 
As a retributivist measure, it is hard to justify as it is not clearly 
linked to desert, to the degree of harm caused, the seriousness of 
the offence, or the culpability of the offender, but is a blanket 
restriction which applies regardless of the seriousness or type of 
offence, which is why the majority of the court in Hirst found it 
unacceptable. It is also an arbitrary and variable punishment, as 
its impact will depend on the timing of an election, which itself 
depends on the vagaries of political life rather than the prisoner’s 
actions, which makes it inconsistent with retributivism. It is not 
necessary for the purposes of punishment and is not linked to the 
gravity of the offence or to the type of offence. It is not, for 
example, limited to those convicted of electoral crimes. It is also 
a degrading punishment in so far as it reduces the prisoner to a 
state of social death. But even if it were accepted as a legitimate 
punishment, then this could not justify the UK ban, as in Hirst’s 
own case, he was serving a discretionary life sentence, and had 
already served the part of the sentence intended to punish, and 
was now serving the extended part of the sentence deemed 
necessary to protect the public.  
 
Justifying the ban on the grounds of deterrence is also difficult. It 
is hard to imagine that a prospective offender would be 
influenced by the prospect of losing voting rights compared to the 
threat of incarceration. Offenders may also be unaware of this 
disqualification, although the issue has now received more pub-
licity because of Hirst and subsequent cases.  
 
A justification on the ground of rehabilitation is also problematic. 
The UK Government has argued that denial of voting rights 
enhances civic responsibility but it could equally be argued that 
disenfranchisement perpetuates isolation and social exclusion, 
whereas restoring the vote and participation in the political 
process would assist rehabilitation by reminding prisoners of the 
obligations and duties of citizenship and thereby encourage a 
sense of responsibility. As the Canadian Supreme Court said in 
Sauvé v Canada (No 2) [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 there is a connection 
between having a voice in the making of law and the obligation to 
obey the law. So the Court was not persuaded by the Canadian 
Government’s argument that a voting ban promotes rehabilitation 
or that it enhances respect for the law.  
 
A major criterion in modern penal policy is public protection, but 
can prisoner disenfranchisement be justified on this ground? If an 
offender had been convicted of voting offences, there might be 
concerns of future interference with the electoral process, but the 
ban is much more general and applies to all offenders. To justify 
the loss of the vote would need an extra element of substantial 
risk, to override such a fundamental right, which would seem to 
be lacking in most cases. A voting ban for offenders convicted of 
voting offences, particularly where there is a risk of re-offending 
and committing further voting offences, might be justifiable, but 
this would apply to very few sentenced prisoners. But even for 
those convicted of voting offences it should apply only for a 
limited period.  
 
This is not to deny that voting fraud has been a concern in recent 
UK elections, for example, in the Birmingham local elections in 
2004, where Mr Justice Mawrey (2005) said that the evidence of 
fraud would have ‘disgraced a banana republic’ [5].
 
There were 
also concerns of electoral fraud in the May 2007 local elections, 
including in Nottingham. A councillor in Slough was convicted by 
an Election Court of illegal and corrupt practices relating to bogus 
postal votes in the May 2007 elections and several other 
individuals have now been convicted of electoral fraud in Slough 
Central Ward. But these problems are less likely to arise in the 
prison environment as it is much easier to check on a prisoner’s 
identity than on a postal voter in the community. There are also 
now new measures to deal with voting fraud and to increase 
conﬁdence in the integrity of the electoral system, in the new 
Electoral Administration Act 2006, based on the recommendations 
of the Electoral Commission (2003). This Act strengthens 
registration procedures by requiring more information for postal 
votes, including dates of birth and records of signatures. It 
creates a new offence of providing false information for the 
purpose of registration when applying for a postal or proxy vote. 
These measures reduce the risk of personation but postal voting 
is still seen as the major risk to electoral integrity in UK elections 
in a recent report by the Council of Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly [6].
 
There may also be concerns about block voting 
which might possibly affect the outcome of an election. An 
example often given is of the Isle of Wight constituency where 
the Isle of Wight Prison, created by the amalgamation of 
Parkhurst, Albany and Camp Hill, has an operational capacity of 
1658, is sited within the constituency in which the successful 
candidate won by a majority of 2826 in the 2001 election, so with 
a narrower majority the result might have been skewed by the 
prison vote [7].
 
However, these issues could be addressed by 
using the prisoner’s former home address for registration. In any 
case the problem of electoral fraud is not the main rationale of 
the government’s denial of the vote to prisoners.  
The case for re-enfranchisement  
As we have seen, the loss of the vote is difficult to justify on 
penological principles, unless we are dealing specifically with 
electoral fraud. Denying prisoners the right to vote increases their 
social exclusion and marginalizes prisoners, denying them the 
opportunity to put pressure on their MP. Re-enfranchisement 
would arguably have the opposite effect, enhancing their citizen 
status, giving them a voice and would also further their 
rehabilitation. These arguments will now be considered.  
The symbolic and practical importance of voting  
The act of voting is a reaffirmation of citizenship. It is an 
important element of social participation which reinforces 
awareness of one’s civic duties and obligations. Restoring the 
vote affirms that individuals are entitled to equal concern and 
respect, regardless of their past deeds – that they have worth 
despite their criminal history. Even if the public do not always 
fully value their own voting rights, in so far as they often will not 
turn out to vote, this does not detract from the symbolic 
importance of suffrage.  
 
In the past, citizenship rights, including the right to vote, have 
been secured through struggle as weak groups have fought to 
improve their conditions. In England in the 19th century, as E.P. 
Thompson (1968) has shown in The Making of the English 
Working Class, the demand for suffrage was a crucial element of 
the realignment of classes in the 1830s. There was intense 
agitation in 1831–32 over the Reform Bill which symbolized the 
prospect of social change. Thompson depicts the crisis of 
1831–32, through which English society was passing, as one in 
which revolution was possible. The constitutional and quasi-legal 
agitation of the people reflected the sharp social and economic 
inequalities of the time and class conflicts crystallized around the 
Reform Bill. Its rejection by the House of Lords in October 1831 
stimulated widespread demonstrations and unrest. If it had not 
ultimately been enacted, there could have been a revolution. 
Reflecting on the public mood of the 1930s, Thompson says:  
 
The vote, for the workers of this and the next decade, was a 
symbol whose importance it is difficult for us to appreciate, our 
eyes dimmed by more than a century of the smog of ‘two-party 
parliamentary politics’. It implied, first, egalite: equality of 
citizenship, personal dignity, worth. (Thompson, 1968: 910, 
italics in original). 
  
Even then the vote was limited by property qualifications and 
restricted to men. In the 1832 Act, only one in seven males was 
eligible to vote. Since then the extension of the franchise has 
been a result of continued political struggle. The franchise was 
extended further in 1884, but still only 60 per cent of male voters 
were eligible. Eventually, the 1918 Representation of the People 
Act abolished property qualifications and allowed all men over 21 
and women over 30 to vote. The denial of the vote to soldiers 
returning from the war, who had been risking their lives to defend 
English democracy, but were excluded from its benefits, was 
clearly an embarrassment for the government. Women over 21 
finally won the vote in 1928 after a protracted struggle.  
 
The fact that the demand for universal suffrage has led to 
imprisonment, hunger strikes and deaths, attests to its 
significance both symbolic and real, notwithstanding the apathy 
and complacency of many modern voters, who have elected 
voluntary disenfranchisement, forfeiting their right to participate 
in the process of government. The vote is not something to be 
surrendered lightly, even if there is dissatisfaction with the choice 
of candidates in a particular election. Of course, in some 
circumstances refraining from voting may be a political protest 
reflecting on the lack of integrity of the electoral process, as in 
the case of the Belarus elections in 2000 and in the second round 
of the Zimbabwean elections in 2008, reflecting the awareness 
that the democratic process had been violated. 
 
Enfranchisement has a real value as it would give prisoners some 
influence in the political process. MPs may be more likely to take 
notice of their views, especially if it is a marginal seat. So it may 
strengthen prisoners’ position in terms of influencing policies 
which may affect them while in prison, and when they return to 
the community. Without a vote, they are effectively non-persons, 
which legitimates the view that prisoners should be forgotten and 
marginalizes them in the minds of governments and the public. 
Even if some prisoners may be indifferent to their voting rights, 
this does not undermine their importance in giving prisoners a 
voice in public debates and affording them some representation. 
If this led to improvements in penal regimes, this would benefit 
all prisoners, including foreign national prisoners who are not 
entitled to vote.  
Voting and re-integration  
For the offender, voting is, in some respects, even more 
important than for the ordinary citizen, because it is a reminder 
of one’s duties under the social contract. It also reinforces a core 
value of democracy, namely equality. But denial of voting rights 
undermines civic respect and respect for the rule of law and 
thereby erodes the process of prisoner rehabilitation, which 
should include an understanding of the obligations and burdens of 
citizenship. 
  
Society may also benefit as enfranchisement promotes the social 
inclusion and re-integration of offenders. There have been no 
large scale research studies of the link between voting and 
offending, but using available statistical data, from a longitudinal 
study of a cohort of Minnesota public school students, Uggen and 
Manza (2004: 213) found that there were ‘consistent differences 
between voters and non-voters in rates of subsequent arrest, 
incarceration and self-reported criminal behaviour’. Clearly, they 
are not arguing that voting is the key factor in law abiding 
behaviour, but this association is worth investigating, and would 
be consistent with the argument advanced above that 
participation in political life can promote a sense of citizenship.  
 
The right to vote would not solve all the problems of social 
exclusion or guarantee substantive rights, any more than giving 
women the vote ensured their equal treatment, but it is a positive 
step as social inclusion may be seen as an important element of 
citizenship as Marshall (1950) has emphasized. The voting ban 
also raises disparate impact issues given the disproportionate 
numbers of black and ethnic minority prisoners in the UK. 
Similarly in the United States black and Hispanic males are 
disproportionately incarcerated relative to their numbers in the 
population, and in Australia a voting ban has a disparate impact 
on aboriginal communities [8]. 
 
 
Proposals for change  
A number of options are being considered by the UK Government. 
It now seems clear from the Consultation Paper that the 
Government is contemplating granting the vote to selected 
groups of prisoners rather than extending it to all, and consider-
ing whether it should be determined by the length of sentence, so 
the ban applies only to longer term prisoners. Some states do 
have partial bans depending on the length of sentence. In 
Belgium, for example, the ban applies to those sentenced to over 
four months, in Austria over one year and in Italy over five years, 
while in Greece there is a permanent loss of the right to vote for 
those sentenced to life imprisonment. In Romania, the ban is 
dependent on the type and seriousness of the offence, so those 
convicted of serious offences lose the right to vote. But the 
problem here is where to draw the appropriate cut-off point. 
Although this is less arbitrary than the current law, in so far as it 
is limited to the seriousness of the offence, the problem remains 
of determining the appropriate point where the line should be 
drawn for disenfranchisement.  
Another option which has been considered is to give sentencers 
discretion to impose a disqualification, in the light of their 
knowledge of the crime, and its impact on victims. In Italy, for 
example, the disqualification from voting is discretionary for 
these sentenced up to five years, but automatic for those 
sentenced to five years or more. But a system which gives the 
sentencer the option to reinstate or withdraw the vote is 
problematic because it would allow too much discretion to 
sentencers. It is difficult to see on what criteria the sentencer 
could make this decision, as most offences will not be 
voting-related. It is not clear how they would decide whether a 
voting ban is relevant to the offence, or how they could decide on 
the merits of individual cases. It raises issues unrelated to the 
original offending behaviour in most cases and increases the 
burdens on sentencers who are already hard pressed. How could 
they justify taking a vote away from one offender, but not from 
another serving a similar term, for an offence of similar gravity? 
If sentencers were to decide on a case-by-case basis, this would 
add to the length of the trial. Divergent decisions between 
offenders convicted of offences of similar gravity would need to 
be justified, but it is hard to see how coherent non-arbitrary 
decisions could be made here. Presumably the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council would be instructed to draft appropriate 
guidance.  
 
A further option being considered is more plausible, namely that 
offenders convicted of electoral offences should lose their right to 
vote. Here a ban might be justified if there is a risk of future 
offending, and of thereby damaging the democratic process. 
Germany, for example, imposes a ban on voting rights for those 
who attack the integrity of the state, the democratic order, and 
for political insurgents, and this could be Convention compliant, 
as Strasbourg jurisprudence has justified infringements of Article 
3 of Protocol No. 1 on the grounds of abuse of a political position 
and misconduct in a public office [9].
 
The Court in Hirst v UK 
thought there might be situations where a ban would be justified, 
for example, gross abuse of a public position, or undermining the 
rule of law and the democratic foundations of society.  
 
The Government is also considering whether voting rights should 
be given to all those detained in mental hospitals on the same 
basis as ordinary prisoners. Patients detained in mental hospitals 
can vote but not if they are offenders detained under criminal 
powers [10].
 
The Government is considering relaxing these rules 
for some offenders. But it could be argued that all patients 
detained in mental hospitals should still be treated as citizens and 
to disenfranchise them is inappropriate in modern conditions with 
more enlightened attitudes. Similar issues of social inclusion 
apply to this group as to ordinary prisoners and both should be 
given access to the electoral process [11]. 
 
 
Conclusion: Future developments  
Bearing in mind these issues, is change likely in the foreseeable 
future? The Government could have introduced amendments in 
the 2006 Electoral Administration Act but did not. There was also 
no reference to this issue in Preparing Britain for the Future: The 
Government’s Draft Legislative Programme 2008/09, published in 
May 2008. The Government has justified its current position on 
the grounds that the majority of public are against restoring the 
vote. Yet the Court in Hirst stressed that public opinion should be 
given less weight where rights are concerned. The public’s lack of 
sympathy may reflect their ignorance of the advantages of 
allowing enfranchisement, as well as their general punitiveness, 
so any changes would need to be carefully presented. It should 
be made clear to the public that many other states allow voting 
without any risk of harm and that the voting process would not 
undermine prison order or security. It would also be relatively 
easy to administer, as procedures for remand prisoners are in 
place, as set out in PSO 4650, and it would not be difficult to 
extend these procedures to encompass sentenced prisoners. The 
Government may perceive, of course, that there are fewer 
political advantages in enhancing prisoners’ lives or status than in 
increasing penal austerity and punitiveness, in which case they 
may consider it more acceptable to the public if just some 
prisoners are re-enfranchised.  
 
It seems that enfranchisement of all prisoners is unlikely at 
present, with, at best, some prisoners serving shorter sentences 
given the vote. If the Government can show that the ban is not 
automatic and that it has reflected on its reasons for restrictions, 
it may have done enough to satisfy the European Court of Human 
Rights that it is Convention compliant and there would be little 
support from the Opposition for radical change. The leadership of 
the Conservative Party is opposed to giving the vote to prisoners. 
However, some Conservative backbenchers and the former 
Conservative minister Douglas Hurd would support 
re-enfranchisement, as would the Liberal Democrats and the 
Scottish National Party. The Chief Inspector of Prisons and some 
prison governors are also in favour of re-enfranchisement. 
Support for change has also come from prison reform groups 
including the Prison Reform Trust (2004, 2007), UNLOCK, the 
National Association for Ex-Offenders, and the Penal Affairs 
Consortium.  
 
There are also some favourable developments which may 
improve the prospects for change. It is clear from both Hirst and 
Sauvé that international rights standards are a much stronger 
influence on penal conditions than in the past. The right to vote is 
also protected by Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. The European Prison Rules are weaker in 
deferring to state practice, but stipulate that ‘Prison authorities 
shall ensure that prisoners are able to participate in elections, 
referenda and other aspects of public life, in so far as their right 
to do so is not restricted by national law’ (Rule 24.11).  
 
Moreover, while the Government is right to point to variations in 
state practice, the general trend worldwide, including Europe, is 
towards re-enfranchisement, as for example in the Irish Republic. 
Before the Electoral (Amendment) Act 2006, prisoners did have 
the right to vote, but only in their constituencies, so in practice 
they were unable to do so. This Act, introduced after Hirst to 
ensure Convention compliance, modernizes the law and gives 
prisoners a right to vote by post. In South Africa, prisoners have 
been allowed to vote since 1999, following the Constitutional 
Court’s decision in August and another v Electoral Commission 
and others (1999) (3) SA 1 (CC) and suffrage was viewed by the 
Court as crucially important in showing that everyone counts. 
Similarly, in Australia in Roach v Electoral Commissioner [2007] 
HCA 43, the High Court quashed provisions introduced in 2006 
disenfranchising all convicted prisoners because it could find no 
rational connection between the disqualification and conduct 
incompatible with participation in the electoral process. However, 
it preserved the pre-2006 law which restricted 
disenfranchisement to those serving more than three years. As in 
the UK, the debate in other jurisdictions has centred on whether 
allowing prisoners to vote would have adverse effects, or whether 
enfranchisement actually promotes social cohesion and inclusion, 
and reinforces the core values of democracy. It is clear from 
international and domestic human rights jurisprudence that rights 
extend beyond the prison door, and that any restrictions need to 
be properly justified but, in the case of a voting ban, as I have 
argued, it is difficult to justify the current restrictions.  
Notes  
[1] Some of the ideas in this article were first presented in 
papers presented to the Criminal Justice Research Group at 
Brunel University in 2006 and to the Sentencing and Punishment 
stream at the Socio-Legal Studies Association Annual Conference 
at the University of Kent in April 2007. I am grateful to 
participants and to the Probation Journal reviewers for their 
helpful comments.  
[2] See www.echr.coe.int/echr.  
[3] See Home Ofﬁce (2008).  
[4] A review of similar research on this issue in the United States 
found that 31 per cent of those interviewed favoured 
re-enfranchisement for serving prisoners (Manza, Brooks and 
Uggen, 2004).  
[5] These issues are further discussed by Stewart (2006).  
[6] See Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (2007: 38).  
[7] Although in the 2005 election the successful candidate won 
by a larger majority, this may be a legitimate concern.  
[8] See Wacquant (2001). About four million prisoners were 
disenfranchised in the 2004 Presidential election, a large number 
of whom were African-American. This is significant when the 
result in Florida was so controversial. The number of citizens is 
enfranchised because of criminal convictions had risen to 5.3 
million by the time of the 2008 Presidential election (see 
www.sentencingprojct.org). It is estimated that 1 in 7 
African-Americans cannot vote because of a felony conviction. 
See also the Australian challenge to the blanket ban on prisoners’ 
voting, in Roach v Electoral Commissioner [2007] HCA 43.  
[9] See, for example, Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v the 
Netherlands, Apps. Nos. 8348/78 and 8406/78. In MDU v Italy, 
App. No. 584500/00 23 January 2003, a ban of two years on 
voting and holding public office was upheld.  
[10] See s2 and s4 of the RPA 2000, and s35 of the Electoral 
Administration Act.  
[11] The implications of voting for the social inclusion of 
individuals with mental health problems are considered further by 
Nash (2002). The issue of whether individuals detained in mental 
hospitals should be able to vote will now be considered in a 
separate consultation process.  
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